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 The District Court certified a class consisting of1
“residents with fully-paid memberships (in the Co-op) as of the
notice of foreclosure on November 10, 2004.”  (District Court
Docket No. 82.)  The parties agreed to a list identifying fifty-two
putative class members, which was submitted to the Court. 
 The federal Section 8 rental assistance program2
provides “rent subsidies for low- and moderate-income
participants so that they can afford to leave privately owned
housing units.”  Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III,
L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 544 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).  It
was established under the United States Housing Act of 1937,
42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq.  Project-based Section 8 assistance,
such as that at issue in this case, is linked to a particular unit.
Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 162 n.2 (3d Cir.
2002).  In contrast, tenant-based assistance provides a
3
OPINION OF THE COURT
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs are a class of former residents of Third East
Hills Park (“Third East Hills Park” or “the property”), an
apartment development in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, who formed
a co-op known as Third East Hills Park, Inc. (the “Co-op”).1
The Co-op entered into a project-based Section 8 Housing
Assistance Payments (“HAP”) contract with the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”).2
participant with a voucher which may be used at any eligible
unit.  Id.
 Section 311, which we discuss at length in Part III.B of3
this opinion, requires HUD, during fiscal year 2006, to take
certain actions in the course of “managing and disposing of any
multifamily property” that it owns or holds and that has “rental
assistance payments under Section 8 . . . attached to any
dwelling units in the property.”  Pub. L. No 109-115, § 311, 119
Stat. 2396.
4
Pursuant to the HAP contract, HUD would pay a portion of the
monthly rent on behalf of eligible low-income tenants.
Plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit seeking to compel action
that they claim was unlawfully withheld by HUD.  First, they
seek an order compelling HUD to maintain the HAP contract at
the property following foreclosure (and purchase and
rehabilitation by a new owner).  They argue that this course of
action is required by Pub. L. No 109-115, § 311, 119 Stat. 2396
(2005) (“Section 311”).   Second, Plaintiffs seek an order3
compelling HUD to provide class members with relocation
assistance at Uniform Relocation Act (“URA”) levels, pursuant
to 24 C.F.R. § 290.17(d), rather than the lesser amount that
HUD provided under 24 C.F.R. § 290.17(c).
Our analysis begins with a threshold issue of the scope of
this appeal.  We find that the appeal of all class members is
properly before us.  Turning to the substantive issues, we hold
that Section 311 did apply to HUD’s management and
disposition of the property at issue in this case.  HUD failed to
make a determination that the property was not feasible for
5continued assistance and therefore failed to comply with the
terms of Section 311.  Accordingly, we reverse the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment and hold that HUD must
reinstate the HAP contract at the property.  We also conclude
that the grant of summary judgment on the issue of relocation
assistance was improper and remand for additional fact-finding
on the issues of whether the tenants were displaced due to a
federally financed project and, if so, whether the tenants who
were entitled to relocation assistance at URA levels received
such assistance.
I.
A.  HUD Inspections and Foreclosure Recommendation
Each resident of Third East Hills Park had an opportunity
to become a shareholder in the Co-op by paying a membership
fee.  When the Co-op was established in 1974, the fee was $350;
this amount has varied over the years.  In 1976, the Co-op
entered into a Section 8 HAP contract with HUD.  The contract
was renewed in 2001 for a twenty-year term.  Under the HAP
contract, HUD pays a portion of each eligible tenant’s monthly
rent, so long as the Co-op meets certain contractual obligations.
Among these, the HAP contract requires the Co-op to lease units
on the property to eligible low-income families and to maintain
and operate the housing units and related facilities to provide
“decent, safe, and sanitary housing.”  (App. at 707.)
The contract also provides that, if HUD determines that
the Co-op has failed to comply with the contract,
[HUD] shall notify the [Co-op] of (1) the nature
of the non-compliance, (2) the actions required to
6be taken and the remedies to be applied on
account of the non-compliance (including actions
by the Owner to cure the non-compliance and,
where appropriate, abatement of housing
assistance payments in whole or in part and
recovery of overpayments), and (3) the time
within which the [Co-op] shall respond with a
showing that it has taken all the actions required
of [it].  If the [Co-op] fails to respond or take
action to the satisfaction of [HUD], [HUD] shall
have the right to terminate the Contract in whole
or in part or take other corrective action to
achieve compliance.
(Id. at 723.)
HUD inspected the property, to ensure compliance,
through its Real Estate Assessment Center (“REAC”).  Annual
inspections, with the purpose of ensuring that units were in a
decent, safe, and sanitary condition, were performed in
accordance with HUD regulations.  The regulations provide for
use of a 100-point scale.  They also allow for inspection of “a
statistically valid sample of the units in [a Public Housing
Authority’s] public housing portfolio.”  24 C.F.R. §
902.20(b)(1).  Although the property at issue here was not
owned by a public housing authority, this same sampling
process was applied.
REAC inspected Third East Hills Park on October 9,
2002; December 5, 2003; and September 22, 2004.  The October
2002 inspection resulted in a score of 53.  A May 2003 letter
identified the deficiencies and gave the Co-op sixty days to
7correct them.  The December 2003 inspection resulted in a score
of 55.  A June 2004 follow-up by HUD’s Departmental
Enforcement Center noted numerous deficiencies, many of
which had been found in prior inspections.  HUD issued a
written notice on July 12, 2004, giving the Co-op thirty days to
correct deficiencies and certify compliance and stating that
failure to do so would cause HUD to pursue any and all
remedies, including abatement or suspension of the HAP
contract and possibly foreclosure.  The September 2004
reinspection resulted in a score of 43 points.  Plaintiffs
contended before the District Court that all exigent deficiencies
were corrected within three business days of the inspection and
that they disputed many of the non-exigent deficiencies.
HUD sent a “notice of abatement” to the Co-op President
on November 10, 2004, explaining that the Co-op had failed to
address the deficiencies outlined in prior letters and was
therefore in default on the HAP contract.  (App. at 745.)  The
notice stated that HUD would abate payments on all of the units
in the property and forbid the Co-op from accepting new Section
8 tenants.  On the same day, HUD sent a separate letter to the
Co-op President.  It stated that HUD would initiate foreclosure
proceedings on the property’s mortgage, which was in technical
default due to the failure to correct the physical deficiencies.
HUD would provide an opportunity to show legal reasons why
a foreclosure should not occur and allow twenty days for the Co-
op to submit its position in writing.  The letter also stated that,
at the Co-op’s request (within seven days), a meeting would be
scheduled – at the Atlanta, Georgia office of HUD – to hear any
legal reasons why HUD should not foreclose upon the property.
(Id. at 780-81.)
8The local HUD office sent a memorandum, also on
November 10, 2004, to HUD’s Atlanta Multifamily Property
Distribution Center, recommending foreclosure on the property.
The memo included the prior inspection reports and other
documentation.  It also included a document entitled “Field
Office Foreclosure Recommendation,” which described the
property.  The Recommendation noted that the property adjoined
two other affordable housing developments, which had both
been sold to developers, who were awarded low-income tax
credits and would be improving those properties.  According to
the Recommendation, Third East Hills Park, in its current
condition, would negatively affect the success of the other
properties.  The area was described in the Recommendation as
“heavily impacted with subsidized housing.”  (Id. at 748.)  The
Recommendation also noted many over-housed units at the
property, meaning that the occupants were living in larger units
than necessary for their household size.  It concluded that the
property should be sold to the City of Pittsburgh and the number
of units reduced.
In response, the Atlanta office requested additional
information regarding the property’s fiscal condition.  On
February 9, 2005, an architecture firm retained by HUD issued
a Comprehensive Repair Survey and estimated the total cost of
repairs at the property to be $2,497,098.  (Id. at 822.)  HUD
determined that the repair costs and operating expenses at the
property exceeded the potential property income and “as-is
value.”  Plaintiffs dispute this analysis.  As they note, a question
at the bottom of HUD’s Sales Analysis form – which analyzed
repair costs, operating expenses, and potential income –
specifically asks whether the project is financially viable after
 The organization that HUD contracted with to provide4
the relocation assistance, Lord and Dominion Investments
Management, sent a letter to residents on or about December 8,
2004.  The letter informed the residents that the Co-op Board
President had requested that Lord and Dominion no longer use
a meeting room on the property to provide relocation assistance
and that, as a result, it would be moving off the property.
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repairs, and the answer given is “yes.”  (Id. at 822.)  The form
also states that the project would produce an annual “net
operating income” of $343,934.  (Id.)
B.  Displacement of Residents
In November 2004, during the same period that it sent the
Co-op a “notice of abatement” and recommended foreclosure on
the property, HUD also sent a “notice of displacement” to
residents informing them of its intent to relocate them for
“health, safety, and security reasons.”  (Id. at 784.)  Residents
with executed leases would receive moving expenses, and
income-eligible tenants would receive a voucher for Section 8
tenant-based rental assistance.  The letter also announced a
December 2, 2004 meeting to discuss relocation benefits.  4
HUD sent another letter on February 10, 2005 to all residents,
advising them of HUD’s intent to foreclose on the property
“within the next few months.”  (Id. at 813.)  It stated that tenants
receiving project-based rental assistance would receive Section
8 voucher assistance if such assistance was available and the
tenant was eligible.  It also provided some of the tentative terms
and conditions of the foreclosure sale and gave residents a
10
number to call with questions or to offer input regarding the
process.
On June 20, 2005, HUD issued a notice to residents,
informing them that relocation assistance would end at the close
of business on July 31, 2005.  Residents were required to have
moved out by that date in order to receive assistance.  Those
who moved out after that date and were certified as eligible for
a Section 8 voucher could still receive one, but would not obtain
relocation assistance.  HUD terminated the HAP contract on
March 10, 2006.  The majority of residents moved out with
relocation assistance, but the parties agree that as of at least
October 26, 2006, fourteen residents remained.
C.  Sale and Purchase of the Property
In March 2005, shortly after HUD had informed residents
of its intent to foreclose, the Urban Redevelopment Authority of
Pittsburgh (“URAP”) informed HUD that it might be interested
in purchasing the property.  (Supp. App. at 27.)  It requested that
HUD consider maintaining project-based Section 8 assistance
for residents who had not moved at the time of foreclosure.  In
an April 2005 response, HUD said it would consider selling the
property to URAP, but that the project-based HAP contract
would not be renewed, as such continuation is “contrary to
current HUD policy.”  (Id. at 29.)
On June 9, 2006, HUD authorized payment to URAP of
a $3,400,000 “up-front grant” contingent on HUD acquiring the
property through the foreclosure sale.  HUD notified remaining
residents on June 22, 2006 that it intended to sell the property to
URAP immediately if it acquired it at auction.  (App. at 877.)
This June 2006 notice included a copy of HUD’s disposition
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plan, with details regarding the transfer of title.  (Id. at 878-80.)
It asked for written comments within thirty days.  The
disposition plan provided that URAP would, within twelve
months of taking title, relocate any remaining residents, either
on or off site, in order to facilitate redevelopment.  URAP would
also reimburse residents for moving expenses and “endeavor to
provide an opportunity to apply for readmission to the
redeveloped property to all current and relocated residents who
desire to return.”  (Id. at 879.)  HUD received no comments on
this initial disposition plan within the thirty-day period.  It
finalized and approved the plan on July 25, 2006.  (Supp. App.
at 32-35.)
HUD and URAP entered into a contract for sale of the
property, conditioned on HUD obtaining title at the foreclosure
sale.  (App. at 883.)  The contract included a rider requiring
URAP to relocate remaining residents within twelve months,
comply with relevant statutes and regulations, reimburse
residents for moving expenses, and provide notice of any
expected displacement.  (Id. at 904-05.)  HUD purchased the
property at foreclosure on October 6, 2006 and immediately
transferred it to URAP through a deed that included this rider.
URAP subsequently entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding with Third East Hills Limited Partnership
(“TEHLP”) and sold the property to TEHLP, which was to
demolish existing units and renovate the property.
Approximately thirty three-bedroom units were to be created,
with special mortgages and subsidies to make them affordable
to most former residents of the property.  First priority was to be
given to those residing on the property on or after October 26,
2006.  Second priority would be given to Co-op members living
12
at the property on or after November 10, 2004.  Anyone else
living at the property on or after November 10, 2004 would
receive third priority.
D.  Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed an “emergency complaint” in this matter
and sought a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) on July 26,
2006.  The District Court granted the TRO on July 27, 2006.
After receiving written submissions and holding a hearing on the
matter, the Court denied a preliminary injunction request on
August 9, 2006.  On January 19, 2007, the District Court granted
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, dismissing all but one claim for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the remaining claim –
alleging the violation of Section 311 – for failing to state a
claim.  The case was closed.
Plaintiffs promptly filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the Court granted, reopening the case.  The District Court
found that its prior opinion was based in part on the Defendants’
misstatement of “HUD’s position regarding the applicability of
§ 311 to the disposition of HUD held mortgages.”  Massie v.
U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., No. 06-1004, 2007 WL
674597, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2007).  HUD’s counsel
acknowledged that, at the time its prior brief was drafted,
counsel “did not know that HUD Office of Multifamily Housing
Programs had determined that it would comply with § 311 in its
disposition of both multifamily properties that the Secretary
owns and multifamily mortgages that the Secretary holds.”  Id.
The District Court also found, contrary to its prior ruling, that it
did have jurisdiction to review a claim that HUD failed to
comply with its own regulations as well as the Plaintiffs’ due
 The Plaintiffs entered a Stipulation of Non-Interference5
on December 4, 2007.  In this stipulation they acknowledged
that the property had been conveyed to HUD, from HUD to
URAP, and then from URAP to TEHLP.  Under the terms of the
stipulation, no members of the Plaintiff class would seek to
reverse the foreclosure sale or seek any equitable relief that
could jeopardize the right of TEHLP to redevelop the property.
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process claims.  The Court issued an order clarifying that three
claims remained: (1) the alleged violation of Section 311; (2)
HUD’s alleged violation of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process
rights, for failing to provide Plaintiffs with an opportunity at the
foreclosure hearing to present factual (and not just legal)
objections to the foreclosure; and (3) HUD’s failure to comply
with its own regulations for management and disposition of the
HUD-held mortgage at Third East Hill Park.
Thereafter, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ request for merits
discovery under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”).
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the
District Court granted Defendants’ summary judgment motion
on all claims.  We discuss the District Court’s reasoning in
detail infra.  The Court then denied Plaintiffs’ motion for
reconsideration, which it found merely rehashed prior
arguments.  This appeal, from the denial of reconsideration,
followed.5
Plaintiffs raise three issues in their brief on appeal.  First,
they contend that HUD violated Section 311 and accordingly
they seek an order compelling HUD to maintain the project-
14
based Section 8 rental assistance at the property.  Second, they
claim that the District Court erred in finding that HUD was not
required to provide a higher level of relocation assistance, in
accordance with 24 C.F.R. § 290.17(d).   Third, in response to
our request for supplemental briefing, they argue that the entire
Plaintiff class, and not Jean Massie alone, filed a proper notice
of appeal from the District Court’s decision.  Because this final
issue shapes the scope of our review, we will address it first.
II.
Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment is de novo.  Nova Chems., Inc. v. Sekisui Plastics Co.,
579 F.3d 319, 323 (3d Cir. 2009).  We construe the facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  TKR Cable Co. v.
Cable City Corp., 267 F.3d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 2001).  Summary
judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Plaintiffs bring claims pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), seeking to “compel agency action
unlawfully withheld.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(1).  As one of our sister
circuits has held, this provision “does not give us license to
‘compel agency action’ whenever the agency is withholding or
delaying an action we think it should take. Instead, our ability to
‘compel agency action’ is carefully circumscribed to situations
where an agency has ignored a specific legislative command.”
Hells Canyon Pres. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 593 F.3d 923,
932 (9th Cir. 2010).
In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542
U.S. 55, 61 (2004), the Supreme Court reviewed the scope of
15
judicial review of agency inaction.  It held that review of an
agency’s “failure to act” is limited to a discrete action.  Id. at 63.
The Court reviewed five categories of agency actions, with the
category of “relief” including, inter alia, a “grant of money [or]
assistance,” which would encompass the HAP contract at issue
in this case.  Id. at 62.  “[T]he only agency action that can be
compelled under the APA is action legally required,” as §
706(1) authorizes courts to compel agency action that is
“unlawfully withheld.”  Id. at 63.  The Supreme Court concluded
in Norton that “a claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where
a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency
action that it is required to take.”  Id. at 64; see also Oil, Chem.
& Atomic Workers Union v. Occupational Safety & Health
Admin., 145 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998) (describing our review
under § 706(1) to include “inaction that is . . . contrary to a
specific Congressional mandate”).  Hence, we review HUD’s
actions in this case to determine if it “failed to take a discrete .
. . action that it is required to take.”  Norton, 542 U.S. at 64.
III.
A.
We directed the parties to brief the issue of who is, or are,
the proper appellant or appellants in this case.  The initial notice
of appeal filed in the case listed “Jean Massie” as the named
party appealing the District Court’s order.  The notice also
included a caption of “Jean Massie, et. al. v. U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, et. al.”  (App. at 1.)  An
amended notice of appeal was subsequently filed and separately
docketed under a distinct case number; it included as the named
parties five plaintiffs, followed by the phrase “on behalf of
 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1) provides:6
(1) The notice of appeal must:
(A) specify the party or parties taking the appeal
by naming each one in the caption or body of the
notice, but an attorney representing more than one
party may describe those parties with such terms
as “all plaintiffs,” “the defendants,” “the plaintiffs
A, B, et al.,” or “all defendants except X”;
(B) designate the judgment, order, or part thereof
being appealed; and
(C) name the court to which the appeal is taken.
A separate provision, in Rule 3(c)(3), specifically deals with
class actions.  It states:
16
themselves and all others similarly situated (certified class).”
(Id. at 2.)  Since this second appeal was untimely, the parties
were directed by the Clerk to address the attempt to add
additional appellants to this case.  Plaintiffs stated in response
that, because the only claims were those asserted by the class as
a whole and the class had been certified under Rule 23(b)(2),
they did not realize that each nominal Plaintiff needed to be
listed on the notice.  HUD argued that we are without
jurisdiction to add parties to the notice of appeal because
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3, which outlines the
requirements for a notice of appeal, is jurisdictional and,
according to HUD, the original notice failed to satisfy Rule
3(c).6
(3) In a class action, whether or not the class has
been certified, the notice of  appeal is sufficient if
it names one person qualified to bring the appeal
as representative of the class.
17
The Supreme Court has held that Rule 3(c) is
jurisdictional in nature and that a court may not waive its
jurisdictional requirements, even for good cause, if it finds that
they have not been satisfied.  Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co.,
487 U.S. 312, 317 (1988).  We conclude that Massie complied
with Rule 3(c) by using the District Court’s caption (which
included “et. al.”) and naming the lead plaintiff in the blank on
the Notice of Appeal form.  Rule 3(c)(1)(A) permits specifying
“the party or parties taking the appeal by naming each one in the
caption or body of the notice.”  The caption on the notice of
appeal included “Jean Massie et. al.”
We also find that the notice of appeal satisfied Rule
3(c)(3), which states that the notice of appeal in a class action
“is sufficient if it names one person qualified to bring the appeal
as representative of the class.”  HUD relies on the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Marrs v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 839, 840
(7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), which held that Rule 3(c)(3)
requires the notice of appeal to specify that the class
representative is appealing in a representative capacity.  The
Marrs opinion does not provide detail regarding the nature of
the notice filed in the case, but states that the notice contained
no indication that the appeal was intended to be in a
representative capacity and “does not mention other claimants
or a class.”  Id.  Although the notice specified the judgment
being appealed, there is no discussion in Marrs of the
18
application of Rule 3(c)(1) and whether a caption with “et. al.”
was included in the notice, as is the case here.  Regardless of
these potential factual distinctions, we disagree with the Seventh
Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 3(c)(3) and find that it merely
requires that a person who is “qualified to bring the appeal as
representative of the class” be named in the notice of appeal and
not that the notice expressly state that the individual is in fact
appealing in a representative capacity.  As noted, we also find
that the class was named in the caption of the notice of appeal,
satisfying Rule 3(c)(1)(A).
Our decision accords with those of circuit courts that
have faced similar situations.  In Olenhouse v. Commodity
Credit Corp., the Tenth Circuit stated that “[w]hile we
discourage use of the phrase ‘et al.’ to identify any group of
appellants, we agree where a class has been certified, the phrase
provides sufficient notice of who is taking the appeal to satisfy
the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 3(c).”  42 F.3d 1560, 1572
(10th Cir. 1994).  Here, the phrase “et al.” had been used in the
caption of the Notice of Appeal, and the singular “plaintiff’s”
appeared in the body.  In Ford v. Elsbury, 32 F.3d 931, 934 (5th
Cir. 1994), the Fifth Circuit found that Rule 3(c), which had just
been amended in 1993 with the intent of “liberaliz[ing] the
pleading requirements for a notice of appeal,” was satisfied.
“The style of the notice identified the plaintiffs as ‘Undray D.
Ford, et al.,’ and the body of the notice identified the appealing
parties as the ‘‘Ford’ plaintiffs.’” Id. at 933.  The court deemed
this sufficient as to all the plaintiffs in the uncertified class
action on appeal.
Accordingly, we find that an appeal on behalf of all class
members is properly before us.
 Fiscal year 2006 ran from October 1, 2005 through7
September 30, 2006.
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B.
Plaintiffs argue that HUD failed to comply with Section
311 when it terminated the HAP contract at Third East Hills
Park.  They contend that the District Court erred when it
deferred to HUD’s interpretation of the applicability of Section
311.
Section 311 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in
fiscal year 2006,  in managing and disposing of7
any multifamily property that is owned or held by
the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development, the Secretary shall maintain any
rental assistance payments under Section 8 of the
United States Housing Act of 1937 that are
attached to any dwelling units in the property. To
the extent the Secretary determines that such a
multifamily property owned or held by the
Secretary is not feasible for continued rental
assistance payments under such section 8, based
on consideration of the costs of maintaining such
payments for that property or other factors, the
Secretary may, in consultation with the tenants of
that property, contract for project-based rental
assistance payments with an owner or owners of
other existing housing properties, or provide other
rental assistance.
20
The text of this provision presents three questions that will
structure our analysis: (1) what does it mean for a “rental
assistance payment” to be “attached to any dwelling units in the
property”; (2) what is the test for whether continued rental
assistance is feasible; and (3) what is the nature of the
consultation required between HUD and the tenants?  This
property clearly satisfied the “owned or held” element of
Section 311, as HUD held the mortgage, a point that the parties
do not dispute.
1.
In order for Section 311 to apply to HUD’s disposition of
the property, the rental assistance payments must have been
“attached to . . . dwelling units in the property” during fiscal
year 2006.  Noting that the statute does not define the term
“attached,” nor did the parties provide any case law interpreting
the term, the District Court drew on a dictionary definition, “to
fast or affix; join; connect.”  (App. at 20.)  The Court concluded
that, since all rental assistance payments on the units were
abated as of November 10, 2004, – no rental assistance
payments were attached to any of the units in fiscal year 2006
and hence Section 311 did not apply.  Plaintiffs and their amicus
argue that instead the crucial date is March 10, 2006, when the
HAP contract was terminated.  On this argument, the housing
assistance payments, which were only suspended during the
abatement period, remained attached to the property, for the
purposes of Section 311, so long as the HAP contract had not
been terminated.
HUD contends that the crucial date is the date of
foreclosure, October 26, 2006, which came after the end of
 The HUD Memorandum provided, in relevant part, that:8
[T]he Secretary is required to maintain the
project-based Section 8 HAP contract in any
multifamily property that the Secretary owns or
21
fiscal year 2006, rendering Section 311 inapplicable.  HUD
claims this date is important as the statute refers to “managing
and disposing” of property.  The foreclosure, according to HUD,
is the act of disposing.  Plaintiffs reject this and contend that
“managing and disposing” must be read to include activities in
furtherance of disposing of the property that began long before
the foreclosure sale itself.  The act of terminating the HAP
contract, they contend, is part of this process of managing and
disposing of the property.  We agree with Plaintiffs and find the
natural reading of “managing and disposing” is that this phrase
refers to a process, which would include, among other steps, the
termination of the HAP contract.  “Managing and disposing”
does not, as HUD argues, refer solely to the precise moment of
foreclosure.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1701z-11 (outlining manner in
which HUD is to manage and dispose of a multifamily housing
project).  Moreover, HUD adopted this same interpretation in its
own memorandum entitled “Fiscal Year 2006 Property
Disposition Program” (“HUD Memorandum”), which was
issued by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Multifamily
Housing Programs to “provide instructions . . . regarding
property disposition requirements for the [Fiscal Year] 2006.”
(App. at 83.)  The memorandum expressly states that Section
311 applies to properties “for which the Secretary holds the
mortgage and is in the process of disposing [of] the property at
foreclosure.”  (Id. at 86) (emphasis added).8
for which the Secretary holds the mortgage and is
in the process of disposing [sic] the property at
foreclosure. To the extent that the Secretary
determines that it is not feasible to continue such
assistance for the property, based on the cost of
maintaining such assistance or other factors, the
Secretary, in consultation with the residents, may
provide project-based Section 8 rental assistance
at another existing property (or properties) or
provide “other rental assistance.” (See below
under the Feasibility Analysis Section, if it is
recommended that the Section 8 HAP contract
should be terminated after the foreclosure sale.)
Note: for properties where assistance under the
project-based Section 8 HAP contract has been
abated and the HAP contract has been or will be
terminated upon completion of the relocation of
all the residents, the Department will not offer the
property with a HAP contract at the foreclosure
sale.
(App. at 86.)
We note that HUD’s Memorandum is not the type of
agency interpretation of a statute to which we afford deference
under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Therefore, we do not deem
it an authoritative interpretation of Section 311.  In United
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001), the Supreme
Court held that “administrative implementation of a particular
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statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority.”  Although administrative agency
interpretations entitled to Chevron deference are typically
products of “notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication[,]” such procedures are not always required.  Id. at
230-31.  However, the Court has held that “interpretations
contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines” are not entitled to Chevron deference.
Id. at 234 (quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,
587 (2000)).
HUD’s Memorandum, from the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Multifamily Housing Programs to the directors of
those programs, is most akin to an agency manual and clearly
“lack[s] the force of law” and does not “warrant Chevron-style
deference.”  Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.  While this type of
informal interpretation could be eligible for lesser deference
under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., depending on “the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, [and]
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,” HUD has
not argued that the Memorandum is entitled to deference under
Skidmore.  323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Lawrence v. City of
Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 316 n.6 (2008).
Moreover, we find that HUD’s actions in disposing of the
property did not even accord with the interpretation of Section
311 provided by the Memorandum.  If anything, as we note,
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portions of the Memorandum provide support for the Plaintiffs’
interpretation of Section 311.
24
Having rejected HUD’s contention that it did not manage
or dispose of the property during the relevant period, we return
to the issue of whether housing assistance payments were
“attached to any dwelling units in the property” during fiscal
year 2006.  The District Court concluded that due to the
abatement of housing assistance payments, according to which
HUD suspended making payments, the payments were no longer
“attached to any dwelling units.”  Plaintiffs emphasize that the
HAP contract remained in place at the property until it was
terminated in March 2006, within fiscal year 2006.   This
distinction has practical importance, because so long as the HAP
contract was not terminated, payments that had been abated or
suspended could be restored if the deficient conditions were
remedied, nullifying the reason or reasons for the abatement.
According to Plaintiffs, so long as the HAP contract was not
terminated, payments remained “attached to . . . dwelling units
in the property” for the purposes of Section 311.  
On this reading, the phrase “attached to any dwelling
units” serves primarily to indicate that Section 311 applies to
“project-based” Section 8 rental assistance, like that at issue in
this case, rather than “tenant-based” assistance.  Hence the issue
is not whether units were still receiving payments at the time in
question, which the District Court focused on, but whether a
valid HAP contract existed at, or was attached to, the property.
This interpretation accords with the use of the term “attached”
in related portions of Section 8 of the Housing Act.
Specifically, the Act provides that “the term ‘project-based
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assistance’ means rental assistance under subsection (b) of this
section that is attached to the structure pursuant to subsection
(d)(2) or (o)(13) of this section.”  42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f)(6)
(emphasis added); see also Truesdell, 290 F.3d at 162 n.2
(“Project-based assistance differs from tenant-based assistance
in that the former is tied to a particular unit, whereas the latter
entails a voucher entitling the participant to select a unit
anywhere in [the relevant] jurisdiction.”).  Section
1437f(o)(13)(A) states that “[a] public housing agency may use
amounts provided under an annual contributions contract under
this subsection to enter into a housing assistance payment
contract with respect to an existing, newly constructed, or
rehabilitated structure, that is attached to the structure, subject
to the limitations and requirements of this paragraph.”
(emphasis added).
Although the text of Section 311 uses the phrase “rental
assistance payments” and does not include the word “contract,”
we find, in light of the nature of project-based Section 8
housing, that the statute should be read to refer to any dwelling
units for which a HAP contract remains in effect.  Therefore, the
important issue is whether there was an existing HAP contract
at the property, not whether payments were actually being made
on individual units.  In addition, we note that HUD endorsed this
interpretation in its Memorandum regarding the “Fiscal Year
2006 Property Disposition Program,” which interprets Section
311.  The HUD Memorandum states that “[i]n accordance with
Section 311 . . . the Secretary is required to maintain the project-
based Section 8 HAP contract in any multifamily property that
the Secretary owns or for which the Secretary holds the
mortgage and is in the process of disposing [of] the property at
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foreclosure.”  (App. at 86.)  The HUD Memorandum expressly
references the HAP contract and not individual payments.  It is
perhaps for this reason that HUD, in its brief on appeal, focuses
on the foreclosure date and not the District Court’s analysis of
the phrase “attached to any dwelling units.”
We find the District Court’s interpretation problematic
for another reason.  If Section 311 only requires HUD to
maintain the rental assistance payment amounts that are actively
being made at the time in question, rather than the payments
attached to the property through the HAP contract, then much
would depend on the determination of a precise moment of
“managing and disposing.”  The HAP contract provides for
fluctuations in the payments being made based on vacant units,
changes in family income or composition, and other factors.
(App. at 709.)  It cannot be that Congress intended for HUD to
maintain only the precise payments being made at a moment in
time, without regard for the contract terms that determine and
adjust the amount of housing assistance payments to be made to
an owner.  Nor do we find it reasonable to conclude that
Congress would want the determination of whether an entire
HAP contract should be maintained at a property to potentially
hinge on whether, at a moment in time or even during a period
of “managing and disposing” of the property, a single unit is or
is not actively receiving payments.  Although such a situation
may seem far-fetched, it gives us further reason to reject this
reading of the statute, particularly when another interpretation
is reasonable, is clearly supported by the use of similar statutory
language in related provisions, and, as discussed below, accords
with the legislative intent.  See United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (“[A]bsurd results are to be avoided.”).
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The conclusion that Section 311 does not apply to a
property when rental assistance payments have been abated
would also effectively render Section 311 inoperative in certain
cases in which, by its terms, it is clearly intended to apply.  This
would violate a core tenet of statutory interpretation, “that no
provision ‘shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’”  In re
Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 330 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted); see also Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985) (discussing
“elementary canon of construction that a statute should be
interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative”) (citation
omitted).  Whenever HUD is in the process of managing and
disposing of a multifamily property it abates housing assistance
payments.  This process is outlined in HUD’s agency handbook
entitled “Multifamily Property Disposition – Management
(4315.1).”  HUD Handbook 4315.1.  The Handbook expressly
provides that when HUD takes ownership of a multifamily
project with a HAP contract, the HAP contract “must not be
canceled.”  Id. § 5-21.   At the same time, the Handbook’s
Appendix includes a form for notifying HUD’s Regional
Accounting Division of HUD’s acquisition of a property.  Id. at
Appendix 5-4.  This form notifies the Regional Accounting
Division that, since HUD has assumed ownership of the subject
project, Section 8 payments to the former owner should be
abated, but the “Section 8 Contract and Budget authority
remaining on this project must not be recaptured.”  Id.  Hence,
abatement always occurs when HUD assumes ownership during
the process of managing and disposing of a multifamily
property.  To find that this abatement process renders Section
311 inapplicable would cause Section 311 to not apply in
situations when the statute’s text specifically states that it does
 We recognize that the HUD Memorandum states, at the9
conclusion of a section analyzing the application of Section 311,
that “for properties where assistance under the project-based
Section 8 HAP contract has been abated and the HAP contract
has been or will be terminated upon completion of the relocation
of all the residents, the Department will not offer the property
with a HAP contract at the foreclosure sale.”  (App. at 86.)
Given our analysis, this passage must be read with the
understanding that the “HAP contract has been or will be
terminated” in accordance with the terms of Section 311.  We do
not read this passage as allowing for “exceptional cases” where
HUD may simply ignore the requirements of Section 311 when
it first abates the contract.  (See Appellee’s Br. at 17.)  To the
extent HUD contends that it has the authority to terminate a
HAP contract through this method, without having to comply
with the terms of Section 311, we reject that position as clearly
in violation of the terms of Section 311.
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apply, when the property “is owned or held” by HUD and HUD
is in the process of “managing and disposing” of the property.9
The legislative history of Section 311 also supports our
reading of the statute.  It reveals strong support for project-based
Section 8 housing and statements of concern regarding HUD’s
commitment to maintaining project-based assistance.  In the
Senate Report, the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed
concern:
that HUD is not committed to maintaining section
8 project-based housing and may be encouraging
owners to opt out of the program. This would be
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a tremendous mistake since affordable housing
needs are growing while the stock of affordable
low-income housing is shrinking. HUD is directed
to report no later than June 30, 2006 on the status
of HUD’s efforts to retain section 8 project-based
housing, including a 5-year analysis of units lost
and retained, by year, State, and locality. HUD is
also directed to provide an analysis of all efforts
made by HUD to preserve low-income section 8
units. The Committee also directs GAO to assess
HUD’s efforts and success in preserving
HUD-assisted low-income housing, especially
section 8 project-based housing, including
recommendations on how better to preserve this
housing.
S. Rep. No. 109-109, at 103, reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1260 (2006) (emphasis added).  The District Court, in its own
analysis, relied substantially upon a misreading of the legislative
history.  The Court analyzed the relevant legislative history and
concluded that both houses of Congress intended for HUD to
shift from a “unit-based” to a “budget-based” program.  The
Court interpreted “unit-based” as a reference to “project based”
Section 8 assistance and “budget-based” as a reference to
“tenant based” Section 8 assistance.
These terms appear in sections of the Congressional
Report entitled “Tenant Based Rental Assistance.”  S. Rep. No.
109-109, at 142; H. Rep. No. 109-153, at 71-74 (2005), 2005
WL 6406124.  In this context, the phrases refer to two different
ways of funding the tenant-based, or voucher, Section 8
program, either a unit-based method (funding a certain number
 The relevant portion of Section 311 provides:10
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of vouchers, equivalent to a certain number of units, and
adjusting accordingly each year for changes in rent and other
variables), or a budget-based method (which would focus on the
total budget).  The House Report makes this clear, as it notes
that in the prior year “Congress estimated the costs of the
Tenant-based program based on units under lease during the
three-month period that immediately preceded passage of the
Act.”  H. Rep. No. 109-153, at 72.  Similarly, in the Senate
Report the Committee “directs HUD to report no later than June
30, 2006 on the effectiveness of this budget-based approach to
vouchers.”  S. Rep. No. 109-109, at 144 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, we believe that the District Court erred when it
interpreted Section 311 as “an attempt to complete the phase-out
of a unit-based program,” which it deemed “the overall point
behind 109 P.L. 115.”  Massie, 2008 WL 4443830, at *10.
Instead, the legislative history reveals Congress’s concern with
“maintaining section 8 project-based housing.”  S. Rep. No.
109-109, at 103.  Clear statements of the intent behind Section
311 reinforce our interpretation of the statutory language and
our conclusion that Section 311 applied to HUD’s management
and disposition of Third East Hills Park.
2.
Having concluded that Section 311 did apply to HUD’s
disposition of the property, we must determine whether HUD
complied with the requirements outlined in the second sentence
of Section 311.   This provision permits HUD to “contract for10
To the extent the Secretary determines that such
a multifamily property owned or held by the
Secretary is not feasible for continued rental
assistance payments under such section 8, based
on consideration of the costs of maintaining such
payments for that property or other factors, the
Secretary may, in consultation with the tenants of
that property, contract for project-based rental
assistance payments with an owner or owners of
other existing housing properties, or provide other
rental assistance.
Pub. L. 109-115, 119 Stat. at 2462.
 At argument, HUD contended that the feasibility11
determination was discretionary, noting the presence of the word
“may.”  We reject this position as completely unsupported by the
statutory language.  The language makes clear that HUD may
provide other forms of rental assistance only “[t]o the extent the
Secretary determines that [the property] is not feasible for
continued rental assistance payments.”  Pub. L. No. 109-115, §
311, 119 Stat. at 2462.  Absent such a determination, HUD
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project-based rental assistance payments with an owner or
owners of other existing housing properties, or provide other
rental assistance,” provided that it has determined that the
property “is not feasible for continued rental assistance
payments.”  Hence, HUD must first make this infeasibility
determination before deciding to provide either project-based
rental assistance at another location or some other form of rental
assistance.   Section 311 further requires that HUD “consult[]11
“shall maintain any rental assistance payments.”  Id.  Moreover,
this interpretation is expressly contradicted by HUD’s own
memorandum, which states that “[i]n the event the
recommendation is not to continue with the project-based
Section 8 HAP contract for all units, the Property Disposition
Center is required to conduct a feasibility analysis.”  (App. at 88
(emphasis added).)
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with the tenants” before providing another form of rental
assistance.  Plaintiffs argue that HUD neither determined that
the property was not feasible for continued assistance nor did it
properly consult with tenants before deciding to provide voucher
assistance for use at other properties.  We address each of these
contentions in turn.
In support of their contention that HUD did not determine
that the property at issue was “not feasible for continued rental
assistance payments,” Plaintiffs cite HUD’s own economic
feasibility analysis, including a survey of needed repairs and a
“Sales Analysis,” which assessed whether the project would be
financially viable after the repairs were made.  The Sales
Analysis, which considered repair costs, annual expenses, and
rental income, among other factors, concluded that the property
would produce an annual “Net Operating Income” of $343,933.
(App. at 821-22.)  At the bottom of the analysis, a section
entitled “Project viability after repairs” asked whether the
project was “Financially viable?” and the answer given was
“yes.”  (Id. at 822.)
HUD failed in its briefing and at oral argument to address
the import of the determination, in its own Sales Analysis, that
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the project was financially viable.  This determination would
appear to foreclose a conclusion that continued rental assistance
is “not feasible.”  HUD contends, however, that the repair
survey it commissioned “demonstrated that needed repairs
would cost almost twice the amount of the current mortgage on
the Property.” (Appellee’s Br. at 40.)  It also notes that the Sales
Analysis, which it also refers to as a “Peer Analysis,”
demonstrated “that repair costs and operating expenses for the
project far exceeded potential property income and ‘as-is’
value.”  (Id.)  Absent, however, from both HUD’s analyses
during the period in which it managed and disposed of the
property and its briefs on appeal is any explanation of why these
assertions indicate that the property is “not feasible for
continued rental assistance payments.”  Repairs may well have
cost more than the current mortgage, but this does not indicate
that once repairs are made that it is not feasible to continue to
provide rental assistance payments.  This is particularly true
where, as here, the analysis expressly concludes that the
property will produce a net operating income.
HUD further contends that Section 311 does not specify
the standards for a feasibility determination.  Section 311 allows
HUD to make a feasibility determination “based on
consideration of maintaining such payments for that property or
other factors.”  Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 311, 119 Stat. at 2462.
HUD claims, relying on Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, that it
possesses discretion regarding the form of the feasibility
determination.  Accordingly, it argues that it conformed with the
standards outlined in its memorandum on the “Fiscal Year 2006
Property Disposition Program,” which includes a section entitled
“Feasibility Analysis.”  (App. at 88.)  The memorandum states
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that HUD’s Property Disposition Center must make a
recommendation regarding the feasibility of continuing with the
Section 8 contract and must conduct a Peer Analysis and
Comprehensive Repair Survey as part of this process.
The HUD Memorandum also provides a list of criteria,
one of which must be satisfied to warrant a determination of
non-feasibility.  The economic criteria requires a showing that
“[t]he costs to rehabilitate the property make it economically
infeasible to pay the monthly debt service needed to amortize
the cost of rehabilitation and pay the expenses of operating the
property on a monthly basis at current Section 8 HAP contract
rents.”  (Id. at 88.)  The rehabilitation costs are to be determined
by the Comprehensive Repair Survey, and the operating costs
are drawn from the Peer Analysis.  As noted, the Peer Analysis,
which considered both the rehabilitation and the operating costs,
concluded that an annual net operating income of $343,934
would be produced and expressly stated that the project was
financially viable after repairs.  (Id. at 822.)   As previously
noted, HUD’s memorandum is not entitled to Chevron
deference.  However, even if we accept and apply the standard
espoused by HUD for making the feasibility determination, we
find no basis to accept HUD’s position that the property was not
feasible for continued rental assistance.  In fact, HUD’s own
analysis clearly indicates the contrary.  Having found that HUD
did not make a proper determination that the property was not
feasible for continued assistance, we necessarily conclude that
HUD failed to comply with the terms of Section 311 and
therefore must reinstate the HAP contract at the property.  
Even if HUD had properly made a determination that the
property was not feasible for continued rental assistance, the
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record indicates that HUD failed to consult with tenants in the
course of providing other rental assistance.  According to
Section 311, if a determination is made that a property is not
feasible for continued rental assistance, “the Secretary may, in
consultation with the tenants of that property, contract for
project-based rental assistance payments with an owner or
owners of other existing housing properties, or provide other
rental assistance.”  Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 311, 119 Stat. at
2462.  This provision requires HUD to consult with tenants
regarding what form of rental assistance it will provide
following termination of a HAP contract.  HUD argues that it
satisfied this consultation requirement through the notice it
provided to tenants of the foreclosure.  The notice included a
copy of the initial disposition plan for the property and gave
tenants thirty days to offer written comments regarding the plan.
(App. at 550.)  HUD emphasizes that it even waited until after
this thirty-day comment period, during which no comments were
received, before finalizing the disposition plan.  (Appellee’s Br.
at 40.)
According to HUD, its consultation process conformed
with the procedure outlined in the HUD Memorandum.
Specifically, the memorandum provides: “[i]f a determination is
made to offer the property for sale without the current project-
based Section 8 HAP contract, the Property Disposition Center
will request through the appropriate Program Center Director,
Section 8 Tenant Protection vouchers to assist all eligible
current residents of the property.”  (App. at 90.)  Hence,
according to the process outlined in the memorandum, HUD
makes a determination of what form of future assistance to
provide prior to any actual consultation with the tenants.
 To the extent that HUD would argue that the12
memorandum’s notice provision provides an interpretation of
Section 311’s consultation requirement that is entitled to
Chevron deference, this position must be rejected.  As already
noted, the HUD Memorandum is not the type of agency
statement entitled to such deference.  Moreover, for the reasons
noted, the process outlined in the memorandum is simply not a
permissible construction of the statutory requirement of
“consultation.”
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Section 311 does not outline the form this consultation
must take nor does it define the term.  We therefore turn to a
dictionary, the proper starting place for ascertaining the plain
meaning of words.  The term  “consultation” is defined as “a
council or conference (as between two or more persons) usually
to consider a special matter” or “deliberation of two or more
persons on some matter.”  Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 490 (1993).  In light of this definition, we find that
mere notice of a foreclosure, accompanied by a copy of the
initial disposition plan and a request for comments, does not
constitute consultation.  Moreover, the letter providing notice
did not make any reference to the possibility of contracting for
continued project-based assistance.  HUD’s process of
developing an initial disposition plan, without any input from
the tenants, and then providing that plan to the tenants with a
request for written comments simply fails to satisfy the plain
meaning of the term “consultation.”   Accordingly, we conclude12
that HUD also failed to comply with Section 311 by not
consulting with the tenants at the property when deciding what
form of assistance to offer.  This failure to consult constitutes a
  The purpose of the URA is to establish “a uniform13
policy for the fair and equitable treatment of persons displaced
as a direct result of programs or projects undertaken by a
Federal agency or with Federal financial assistance.”  42 U.S.C.
§ 4621(b).
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separate basis for our conclusion that HUD violated Section 311
and therefore must reinstate the HAP contract at the property.
C.
Plaintiffs raise a second issue on appeal, contending that
the District Court erred when it concluded that 24 C.F.R. §
290.17(c) governs the provision of relocation assistance in this
case, rather than 24 C.F.R. § 290.17(d).  Section 290.17
provides for relocation assistance when tenants are displaced
from either HUD-owned multifamily properties or such
properties that are subject to HUD-held mortgages.  The District
Court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that HUD was required,
pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 290.17(d), to provide relocation
assistance at Uniform Relocation Act (“URA”) levels.   The13
Court found that the case clearly fell within subsection (c), and
not (d), and therefore Plaintiffs were only entitled to relocation
assistance at the lower levels provided for in subsection (c).
Specifically, the Court held that Plaintiffs did not satisfy the
definition of “displaced person” in subsection (d), that is, “any
person (family, individual, business, or nonprofit organization)
that moves from the real property, or moves personal property
from the real property, permanently, as a direct result of
acquisition, rehabilitation or demolition for a federally assisted
 Federal regulations define a “program or project,”14
within the context of Uniform Relocation Act assistance, as
“any activity or series of activities undertaken by a Federal
Agency or with Federal financial assistance received or
anticipated in any phase of an undertaking in accordance with
the Federal funding Agency guidelines.”  49 C.F.R. §
24.2(a)(22). 
 The District Court also found that the November 17,15
2004 notice (which it incorrectly identifies as November 14),
informed residents that relocation was necessary due to health,
safety, and security concerns and expressed HUD’s hope that
tenants would relocate.  The Court concluded that these
individuals were not “displaced” because they were not
“required to relocate,” but instead were given a choice.  It is not
clear how the Court reached this conclusion.  The November 17,
2004 Notice was entitled “Notice of Displacement.”  (App. at
784.)  We cannot agree with the District Court’s conclusion that
relocation was a voluntary choice.  The tenor of the letter, read
as a whole, clearly indicates that relocation was presented as
necessary and required, not as an option, and that HUD merely
wished that tenants would make the process as smooth as
possible.
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project.”   The Court found that HUD’s November 10 and 17,14
2004 notices to Plaintiffs were issued because of indecent
conditions at the property, and not to further a federally assisted
project.   The Court also emphasized that HUD abated rental15
payments and terminated the contract before HUD published its
disposition plan and entered into any contract with URAP.
 HUD’s Handbook on Multifamily Property Disposition16
provides for assistance at URA levels whenever a “project sale
is subsidized” and persons are displaced.  HUD Handbook
4315.1, Chap. 13, § 13-5(B).  
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Plaintiffs, in their Reply brief, identify record evidence
indicating that HUD had developed its redevelopment plan
before “it declared the conditions default or began relocating
residents.”  (Reply Br. at 23.)
Plaintiffs argue that, because HUD conveyed the property
at foreclosure to the URAP and provided a grant of $3,400,000
for demolition and development, this case falls within the
parameters of 24 C.F.R. § 290.17(d), since federal financial
assistance was provided.   We agree that the rehabilitation of16
the property was a “federally assisted project.”  The question
that remains, however, is whether the tenants were displaced due
to this project or instead, as the District Court found, due to
conditions at the property.  We understand Plaintiffs’ argument,
at its core, to be that HUD was driven by its intent to redevelop
the property and only used deficient conditions, which it could
feasibly have repaired, as an excuse to foreclose on the property.
Without foreclosing, it would have been unable to transfer
ownership.  HUD does concede that it “has additional regulatory
obligations under 24 C.F.R. § 290.17(d) with regard to those
residents that declined to exercise their right to relocate as a
result of HUD’s abatement of the HAP contract.”  (Appellee’s
Br. at 46.)  Hence, HUD appears to acknowledge that the project
was federally financed and that these final fourteen residents
were displaced due to the project (rather than the conditions that
 Defendants proceed to discuss how the requirements of17
Section 290.17(d) were satisfied as to the final remaining
residents.  In their Reply, Plaintiffs do not respond directly to
this claim, instead arguing that HUD failed to provide for
“ownership-level” URA relocation assistance.  They rely on 49
C.F.R. § 24.2(20)(ii), which provides that an interest in a Co-op
constitutes ownership, and therefore assert that a comparable
replacement dwelling must include an ownership interest. On
the record before us we cannot determine whether these
residents received the appropriate level of assistance.  This is an
issue to be resolved by the District Court on remand.  
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HUD claims precipitated abatement and notice to tenants in
November 2004).17
We find that there is evidence that supports Plaintiffs’
position that all of the displacements were due to a program
involving federal financial assistance.  This evidence includes
the East Hills Visioning Plan of June 9, 2004, which
recommended a reconfiguring and rebuilding of Third East Hills
Park.  (App. at 565.)  The Plan was commissioned by URAP,
but the task force included members of the local HUD office.
A sworn affidavit from an architect who participated in the task
force stated that the group, which included a HUD
representative, was working on creating the visioning plan from
August 2003 through July 2004.  (Id. at 523-25.)  According to
the affidavit, the task force reached a consensus decision that
foreclosure was necessary in order to redevelop the property.
(Id.)  Given the contract in place at the building, foreclosure was
necessary to eliminate restrictions on the property, which
allowed it to be used only as affordable rental housing for
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twenty years and did not permit a reduction in the number of
units during that period.
In addition, the Field Office Foreclosure
Recommendation sent by the local HUD office on November
10, 2004 to the Atlanta Multifamily Property Disposition Center
stated that the property’s “current physical condition . . . will
negatively impact the success of [the redevelopment of
adjoining properties] if ownership is not changed to an entity
that will work positively with management.”  (Id. at 748-49.)
The Foreclosure Recommendation also stated that most
residents were over-housed and recommended sale of the
property with the intent of downsizing units.  This
recommendation preceded the Repair Survey and the
termination of the HUD contract based on a technical default.
We agree with Plaintiffs that this and other evidence in
the record demonstrate a disputed issue of material fact as to the
cause of the displacement of tenants at Third East Hills Park.
The record contains evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could conclude that HUD sought to foreclose upon the
property and refused to make feasible repairs in order to
facilitate a redevelopment project that it financed.
HUD has contended that, to the extent that the URA does
apply, Plaintiffs’ claims still must fail as they have not
exhausted their administrative remedies to challenge HUD’s
determination of their eligibility for relocation assistance.  The
relevant regulation related to the Relocation Act merely allows
for an administrative appeal, which a party “may file,” but does
not require this.  24 C.F.R. § 290.17(f).  In Darby v. Cisneros,
509 U.S. 137, 154 (1993), the Supreme Court held that “where
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the APA applies, an appeal to ‘superior agency authority’ is a
prerequisite to judicial review only when expressly required by
statute or when an agency rule requires appeal before review
and the administrative action is made inoperative pending that
review.”  Here such review is not expressly required, but merely
permitted, and hence exhaustion of the administrative appeal
process was not necessary.
Accordingly, we find the grant of summary judgment on
this issue improper and remand for additional fact-finding on the
issues of whether the tenants were displaced due to a federally
financed project and, if so, whether the tenants who were
entitled to relocation assistance at URA levels received such
assistance. 
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District
Court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of
Defendants, direct HUD to reinstate the HAP contract at Third
East Hills Park, and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
